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Abstract
With the fast development in Cloud storage technologies and ever increasing use of
Cloud data centres, data privacy has become a must. Indeed, Cloud data centres store
each time more sensitive data such as personal data, organizational and enterprise data,
transactional data, etc. A commonplace solution is data encryption, however, achieving
privacy and confidentiality with flexible searchable capability is a challenging issue. In
this article, we show how to construct an efficient predicate encryption with fine-grained
searchable capability. Predicate Encryption (PE) can achieve more sophisticated and flex-
ible functionality compared to traditional public key encryption. We propose an efficient
predicate encryption scheme by utilizing the dual system encryption technique, which can
also be proved to be IND-AH-CPA (indistinguishable under chosen plain-text attack for
attribute-hiding) secure without random oracle. We also carefully analyze the relation-
ship between predicate encryption and searchable encryption. To that end, we introduce
a new notion of Public-Key Encryption with Fine-grained Keyword Search (PEFKS). Our
results show that an IND-AH-CPA secure PE scheme can be used to construct an IND-
PEFKS-CPA (indistinguishable under chosen plain-text attack for public-key encryption
with fine-grained keyword search) secure PEFKS scheme. A new transformation of PE-
to-PEFKS is also proposed and used to construct an efficient PEFKS scheme based on
the transformation from the proposed PE scheme. Finally, we design a new framework
for supporting privacy preserving predicate encryption with fine-grained searchable ca-
pability for Cloud storage. Compared to most prominent frameworks, our framework
satisfies more features altogether and can serve as a basis for developing such frameworks
for Cloud data centres.
Keywords: Predicate Encryption, Public-Key Encryption with Fine-grained Keyword
Search, Data Privacy, Data Confidentiality, Cloud Storage, Cloud Data Search
Framework.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing is penetrating each time more in all everyday activities of people,
enterprises, banks, businesses, organizations and alike. Indeed, Cloud computing is a
disruptive technology changing very fast the landscape of very large scale computing and
embracing all kinds of human activity. This fast penetration is explained by the many
features of Cloud platforms, offered through everything as a service, namely, software,
hardware, applications, data storage, etc., at reasonable costs. This is especially rele-
vant to Small and Medium Size (SMEs) enterprises allowing flexibility, agility through
tailorable solutions to their needs and alleviating the burden of maintenance and develop-
ment of their proper private Cloud. There is however one important obstacle for massive
Cloud adoption: the control over data at the Cloud! By using Cloud solutions it is as-
sumed that at the end data is controlled by the Cloud owners, despite advances in the
definition of SLA (Service Level Agreement) to protect users’ data. Notorious examples
of such loose of data control are the data outsourcing not only from SMEs but even from
big corporations, which prefer data outsourcing to reduce costs of proper data centres.
The challenging issue is therefore how to balance the benefits of the Cloud computing
with ensuring sensitive valuable data from not being searched, accessed, stolen or leaked
by malicious entities. Unfortunately, to date there is less progress in data protection than
other Cloud services.
A reasonable and yet practical way to address the data privacy issue at Cloud would
be to first encrypt the data sets and then outsource them to the Cloud [1]. Assuming
that this can be done by the entity that outsources the data, the data security and pro-
tection would then rely on the strength of the encryption algorithm. Although there is a
significant progress in achieving stronger encryption algorithms, the development of such
algorithms should go hand-by-hand with the ability of other algorithms to process the
data. For instance, it should be possible to run data mining algorithms directly on the
cipher-texts. In other words, the development of new generation encryption algorithms
should not compromise the ability to process and analyze the data. To address such
issues, the cryptographic community is devoting many efforts to develop more advanced
cryptographic techniques, such as fully homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryp-
tion has a nice feature, namely, it can support meaningful operations on the cipher-texts
just like on the plain-texts, such as “addition”, “multiplication”, “xor”, “comparison”
operations and even more complex computations are possible. The drawback however is
that according to the state of the art, these algorithms are not very fast to deal with very
large data sets and large data streams, yet they offer solutions to cope in practice with
the data privacy issue at Cloud for many real life applications.
1.1. Motivation
Given that it is desirable to preserve the ability of data processing, analysis and
mining algorithms, a foremost requirement for the encrypted data would be to ensure a
very basic operation of such algorithms, namely, an efficient and flexible searching on the
cipher-texts. The problem that arises here is that when the data sets are encrypted by
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the data owner, the resulted cipher-texts will loose the original data sets’ natural indexing
structure and therefore hinders an efficient and secure search. One way to overcome this
problem, and thus ensure efficient and secure search, is to use hybrid encryption with
keyword search (hereafter denoted, HEKS), which consists of public key encryption with
keyword search and the underlying symmetric encryption. However, this technique has
two shortcomings:
1. First, several natural but complex searching queries cannot be supported. For ex-
ample, let us suppose that Corporation A outsources its data sets in encrypted form
to the Cloud, and later would like to execute a query search on its cipher-texts with
the search pattern ((“Finance Department Related File” OR “CEO Charlie Signed
File”) AND “All Technique Supporting Department Employees’ Agreement File”).
Unfortunately, the traditional hybrid encryption with keyword search cannot imple-
ment easily this kind of search.
2. Secondly, privacy preserving searching queries cannot be implemented either. Re-
ferring again to the above example, the Cloud search engine may know the search
keywords “Finance Department Related File” or “CEO Charlie Signed File” or
“Technique Supporting Department Employees’ Agreement File”, however, in some
situations these keywords are very sensitive and might not be known by the Cloud
search engine. Corporation A needs therefore a mechanism to implement privacy
preserving search, although attribute based encryption and attribute based key-
word search can implement complex search patterns such as the above example,
they cannot implement them in a privacy preserving manner.
In this paper, in order to overcome the above shortcomings, we propose an efficient
predicate encryption (PE) and show how to use it to implement a public key encryption
with fine-grained searchable capability mechanism (PEFKS). Additionally, by combing
PEFKS and PE into an integral encryption system, we are able to design a privacy pre-
serving framework supporting an efficient predicate encryption with fine-grained search-
able capability.
1.2. Overview of PE and PEKS definition and concepts
Let us briefly recall here some main definitions and concepts on PE and PEKS.
Encryption (PE)
Traditional public key encryption aims to achieve a one-to-one secure communication,
data is encrypted under a particular established public key, say belonging to a person, and
then the cipher-text can be decrypted by using the corresponding private key, whereby
this person can only get the entire plain-text or nothing. This feature is sufficient when
the structure of Internet is simple such as standard client-server applications of recent
past, but for many emerging applications like secure transactional Cloud systems, it is in
fact insufficient to satisfy the very demanding requirements for flexibility under complex
applications. In 2008, Katz, Sahai and Waters [2] proposed the concept of Predicate En-
cryption (PE), which is a very flexible encryption scheme. Given in input the cipher-text
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CTI and secret key Keyf , PE can evaluate more sophisticated and flexible functionality
F : Keyf × CTI → {0, 1}∗. For predicate encryption, a predicate is embedded in a key
and a cipher-text corresponds to an attribute vector. A cipher-text with attribute vector
I can be decrypted by the secret key skf if and only if f(I) = 1. PE actually is a gener-
alization of several recent new encryption paradigms, such as Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE), Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), Hidden-Vector Encryption (HVE), all of them
aiming at extending fine-grained encryption capability. Attribute-hiding (AH), which is
essential for predicate encryption, is stronger than payload-hiding. For attribute-hiding,
the associated attribute as well as the plain-text will be hidden from a cipher-text, while
for payload-hiding, only the cipher-text conceals the plain-text. Currently, propelled by
Cloud computation and its security issues, there has been increased attention from secu-
rity community to advance on the efficient outsource computation at the Cloud [3, 4, 5, 6].
These predicate encryption schemes can have broad application to secure Cloud storage
for their properties of payload-hiding and attribute-hiding.
In order to obtain a fully secure PE, the dual system encryption technique introduced
by Waters [7] can be useful. In a dual encryption system, there are normal keys, semi-
normal keys, normal cipher-texts and semi-normal cipher-texts. We only use the semi-
functional keys and semi-functional cipher-texts in games of the security proof, while the
normal keys and normal cipher-texts are used in the real system. The security proof
organized as a sequence of games which can be proved to be indistinguishable. For the
first game, the keys and cipher-texts are assumed normal, while in the second game, the
cipher-text is semi-normal and the keys remain normal. In subsequent games, the attacker
can only get semi-functional keys one by one. When reaching to the final game, all the
keys are semi-functional, and thus they are no useful for decrypting a semi-functional
cipher-text, therefore it is relatively easy to prove the security.
Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS)
On the other hand, the concept of Public-Key Encryption with Keyword Search
(PEKS) was first proposed by Boneh et al. [8]. To exemplify its definition, consider
the following scenario: the email server can intelligently deliver one’s emails according to
some keywords attached to the emails. Therefore, some trapdoors for the keywords are
generated by the user and then are sent to the server, thereafter these keywords in the
emails can be tested by the server and in case the test outputs true, the corresponding
email will be sent to the user. Abadalla et al. [9] proposed that the consistency and
security properties must be satisfied by a practical PEKS. The first property states that
only if the trapdoor and the cipher-text are matched, the decryption can be succeeded.
The second property states that, the keywords will be hidden by the cipher-text unless
the trapdoor is given. In [8] was proved that PEKS implying anonymous IBE, while in [9]
was proved that a secure and consistent PEKS can be constructed by an anonymous IBE.
Therefore, the anonymous IBE and PEKS were shown to have a tight connection.
1.3. Our Contribution
In this paper, the connection between anonymous IBE and PEKS is further investi-
gated. More precisely, we focus on the relationship between PE and PEKS schemes. Our
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results are as follows:
1. We present a fully secure predicate encryption for the class of inner-product predi-
cates without random oracles. Compared to previous state of the art systems, our
proposal has several improved properties. First, the full security of our construction
can be proved based on simple assumptions by dual encryption system. Secondly,
compared to Katz et al.’s scheme [2], the computational cost of our scheme is halved,
thus being more efficient. As a matter of fact, for each attribute in the cipher-text
and user’s key, there is only one group element and for each attribute in the decryp-
tion algorithm, it only requires one pairing operation, resulting overall in a much
more efficient scheme.
2. In previous searchable encryption schemes, only the presence of one keyword in the
cipher-text can be tested by the server. Our Public-Key Encryption with Fine-
grained Keyword Search (PEFKS) not only can test whether multiple keywords are
present in the cipher-text, but also can evaluate the relations of the keywords, such
as equal, disjunction/conjunction. One may argue that, by adding some relations of
keywords, only from single keyword search such complex relations can be obtained,
however this does not hold, since some unnecessary information can be derived by
the server. We also discuss the consistency property and the formal security model
of PEFKS through the challenge and the adversary’s interactive game.
3. We prove that IND-AH-CPA secure predicate encryption has a tight connection
with IND-PEFKS-CPA secure PEFKS and thereof propose a transformation from
PE to PEFKS (PE-to-PEFKS), which is an efficient and practical solution for many
Cloud applications. From our predicate encryption scheme, we are able to construct
an efficient PEFKS scheme.
4. Finally, we present a privacy preserving framework for implementing efficient pred-
icate encryption with fine-grained searchable capability and provide analysis of its
security. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first framework simultaneously
having privacy preserving, confidentiality and efficiently supporting fine-grained
searchable properties.
1.4. Related Work
In 2008, Katz, Sahai and Waters in [2] proposed the notion of predicate encryption as
a generalization of IBE. In their predicate encryption, a vector v¯ ∈ Znp \{0¯} is associated
with a predicate f and attribute x¯ ∈ Znp \{0¯} is associated with the key. If x¯v¯ = 0, then
fv¯(x¯) = 1, else fv¯(x¯) = 0. Their construction achieved thus attribute-hiding property.
However this scheme was not efficient and can only be proved to be selectively secure in the
IND-AH-CPA game. Shi and Waters [10] defined delegation for predicate encryption, and
proposed a new security model for delegation. They presented an efficient construction,
which can support conjunctive queries. Likewise, their scheme can only achieve selective
and CPA security. A fully secure (H)PE scheme for inner-product predicates was proposed
by Lewko et al. [11] in the standard model based on the dual system methodology. But
their scheme is only CPA secure and inefficient. Recently, Zhang et al. [26, 13, 14, 15,
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16, 17] proposed functional encryption with various interesting properties, Attrapadung
et al. [18] proposed interesting conversions among several types of predicate encryption
and discussed their applications to ABE with various compactness tradeoffs.
Boneh et al. [8] first gave the concept of public-key encryption with keyword search
(PEKS). Some constructions of PEKS have been reported and they also proved that a
secure IBE can be implied by a PEKS scheme. It was left as an open problem how to
construct PEKS from IBE. In [9], Abdalla et al. did further work on PEKS. They made
two important contributions. First, computational, statistical and perfect consistency are
formulated via an experiment involving an adversary and the scheme. Second, a trans-
formation from an anonymous IBE to a secure PEKS that guaranteed consistency and
security was shown. There have been many research work on single keyword search, which
clearly do not cover the case, which arises in many practical situations, when the search
pattern is made of multiple keywords. On the other hand, recently, there are reported sev-
eral techniques to efficiently implement secure search on confidential Cloud storage. Li et
al. [19] proposed a novel way to enable efficient fuzzy keyword search over encrypted data
for Cloud storage. Recently, Cao et al. [20] described a privacy preserving multi-keyword
text search protocol in the Cloud setting supporting similarly-based ranking. Zheng et al.
[21] proposed the VABKS system, which can achieve verifiable attribute-based keyword
search over outsourced encrypted data. In Infocom’14, an attribute-based keyword search
scheme has been given by Sun et al. [22], in which the data owner’s search delegation
right can be protected. Recently an efficient verifiable conjunctive keyword search scheme
was proposed by Sun et al. [23] for large dynamic encrypted Cloud data. However until
now there is not much research work on how to implement preserving privacy encryption
and fine-grained searching simultaneously.
1.5. Paper’s organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminaries.
We present our proposal on PE and analyze its security in Section 3. In Section 4, we
present PE-to-PEFKS transformation and construct a concrete PEFKS scheme. In Sec-
tion 5, we present our privacy preserving framework for implementing efficient predicate
encryption with fine-grained searchable capability and sketch the analysis on its security.
Finally, we end the paper in Section 6 with some conclusions and an outlook for future
work.
2. Preliminaries
To facilitate the reading of the paper, we give some preliminaries, basic definitions
and terminology. We introduce the notion of predicate encryption, mainly focusing on
the class of inner-product predicates and further in this section we give the definition of
public-key encryption supporting fine-grained keywords search and the security model. In
the last subsection, we describe the mathematical tools, composite order bilinear groups
and the related complexity assumption.
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2.1. Predicate Encryption
An inner-product predicate encryption scheme supports functionality F : Keyfv¯ ×
CTx¯ → {0, 1}∗, where x¯ ∈ Znp \{0¯} and v¯ ∈ Znp \{0¯}. If x¯v¯ = 0, then fv¯(x¯) = 1, else
fv¯(x¯) = 0. We denote the cipher-text space as C and the message space as M .
Four algorithms Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt for predicate encryption are
defined as follows:
1. Setup(1λ) → PK,MK). Given the security parameter 1λ, the public parameters
PK and the corresponding master key MK are given out as the outputs;
2. KeyGen(MK, v¯) → skv¯. This algorithm takes as input the master key MK and a
predicate vector v¯, and outputs a user key skv¯;
3. Encrypt(PK, x¯,m) → c. This algorithm takes as input an attribute vector x¯ and
the public parameters PK, and outputs a message m ∈M and a cipher-text c ∈ C;
4. Decrypt(skv¯, c) → m or ⊥. This algorithm takes as input the user key skv¯ and a
cipher-text c, and outputs the plain-text m if and only if fv¯(x¯) = 1.
In [11], IND-AH-CPA security for PE systems is defined by Lewko et al. via the
following game. In subsection 4.1, for the construction of IND-PKES-CPA scheme, we
will see that the IND-AH-CPA security definition is sufficient.
1. Setup. The challenger runs this algorithm and the adversary will get the public
parameters;
2. Phase1. The adversary is allowed to adaptively issue queries for private keys on
various predicates vector v¯;
3. Challenge. Two equal length messages m0 and m1 and two attribute vectors x¯0, x¯1
are submitted by the adversary where fv¯(x¯0) 6= 1 and fv¯(x¯1) 6= 1 for all the key
queried in Phase 1. The challenger flips a random coin b and then encrypts mb with
x¯b, which is c
∗. Then the adversary will get it as the challenge cipher-text;
4. Phase2. In this phase, adaptive queries for private keys can be continued to be
issued, except the key query for predicate fv¯(x¯0) = 1 and fv¯(x¯1) = 1;
5. Guess. Finally a guess b′ of b is given out by the adversary.
In this game|Pr[b = b′]−1/2| is defined as the advantage of an IND-AH-CPA adversary.
Definition 1. If for all polynomial time adversaries, they only have at most a negligible
advantage in the above security game, then the predicate encryption scheme is IND-AH-
CPA secure.
2.2. Public-key Encryption with Fine-grained Keywords Search
For one single message, there may exist many keywords in practice, such as conjunction
predicates “urgent and business” in emails. Also the server often needs to search the emails
with disjunction predicates like “family or company”. This requirement can be satisfied
by the public-key encryption with fine-grained keywords search (PEFKS). In PEFKS, a
user can define more fine-grained relationship of keywords for the cipher-texts, which
significantly extend appropriately in practice. PEFKS can be defined by the following
algorithms.
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1. KG(1k)→ (pk, sk), given the security parameter λ as input, this algorithm outputs
a secret key sk and the corresponding public key pk; this is the key generation
algorithm.
2. Td(sk, w¯), this algorithm takes the secret key sk and keywords vector w¯ as input,
and tw for keywords vector w¯ are given out as the outputs; we call this algorithm
as the trapdoor generation algorithm.
3. PEFKS(pk, x¯) → δ), this algorithm takes public key pk and keywords vector x¯ as
input, and outputs δ for keywords vector x¯; we call this algorithm as the encryption
algorithm.
4. Test (tw, δ) → {0, 1}, this algorithm takes in input the cipher-text δ for keywords
vector x¯, and the trapdoor tw for keywords vector w¯, and outputs 1 if w¯x¯ = 0, other-
wise outputs 0; we call this algorithm as the search (or test/verification) algorithm.
Consistency. The consistency notion is defined by an experiment involving an adver-
sary, in analogy with the definition of [9]. The experiment ExpPEFKS−CONSISTENTPEFKS,L (l)
is as follows: (pk, sk) ← KG(1l), w¯, x¯ ← L(pk), w¯, x¯ 6= 0, tw ← Td(sk, w¯), s ←
PEFKS(pk, x¯), if w¯ 6= 0 and Test(tw¯, s) = 1 then return 1 else return 0. The advantage
of L is defined as AdvPEFKS−CONSISTENTPEFKS,L (l) = Pr[Exp
PEFKS−CONSISTENT
PEFKS,L = 1]
If the advantage is 0 for all adversaries L(computationally unrestricted), we call the
scheme as perfectly consistent; if the advantage is negligible for all adversaries L(computationally
unrestricted), we call the scheme as statistically consistent; if the advantage holds for all
polynomial time adversaries L, we call the scheme as computational consistent. Computa-
tional consistency is adequate in practice, although it is weaker than statistical consistency
and perfect consistency.
Security. We define the semantic security model (IND-PKFES-CPA) for the PEFKS.
1. Setup. The KG algorithm is run by the challenger to get (pk, sk), where pk is given
to the adversary;
2. Phase 1. In this phase, the adversary can adaptively issue queries on various key-
words vector w¯ to get the corresponding trapdoors tw¯;
3. Challenge. Two keywords vectors x¯0, x¯1 are submitted by the adversary where x¯0 ·
w¯ 6= 0 and x¯1 · w¯ 6= 0 for all previous queried keys during Phase 1. The challenger
flips a random coin b, and the adversary is given δ∗ ← PEFKS(pk, x¯b);
4. Phase 2. Like Phase 1, adaptive queries are issued by the adversary except that
x¯0 · w¯ = 0 and x¯1 · w¯ = 0;
5. Guess. A guess b′ of b is finally outputted by the adversary.
In this game the advantage of the IND-PEFKS-CPA adversary is defined as |Pr[b′ =
b]− 1/2|.
Definition 2. In this security game, if at most a negligible advantage can be achieved by
all polynomial time adversaries, we call the PEFKS scheme as IND-PEFKS-CPA secure.
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2.3. Assumption
Our scheme relies heavily on composite order bilinear groups. In 2005, Boneh, Goh,
and Nissim [24] first introduced the composite order bilinear groups for constructing
homomorphic encryption. Elliptic curves over finite fields can be used to instantiate the
composite order bilinear groups. Usually we require that the elliptic curve group order N
should be hard to factor, which can be of 1024 bits.
There exists a composite order bilinear group generation algorithm G for the elliptic
curve group, we can also find an algorithm taking a security parameter 1λ as input and
let (N = p1p2p3, G,GT , e) be the output, where G and GT are cyclic groups of order N ,
p1, p2, p3 are distinct primes and e : G×G→ GT is a bilinear pairing such that:
1. Bilinear: for all a, b ∈ Zp and u, v ∈ G, there exist e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: we can efficiently find a g such that e(g, g) has order N in GT .
The subgroups of G with order p2p3, p1p3, p1p2 are denoted as Gp1 , Gp2 , Gp3 , satisfy the
orthogonality property [25], namely, when hi ∈ Gpihj ∈ Gpj i 6= j, then e(hi, hj) is GT ’s
identity element. We use this property in our construction next.
Now we formulate three complexity assumptions based on which we will prove security
of our scheme. These subgroup assumptions are extensions of assumptions in [25]. We
introduce an additional term h ∈ Gp1 , which will not add advantage to A since the
challenge tuples are independent of h.
Assumption 1: The following distribution is defined by given a group generator G:
G = (N = p1p2p3, G,GT , e)
g, h←R Gp1 , X3 ←R Gp3
D = (G, g, h,X3)
T0 ←R Gp1 , T1 ←R Gp1p2
Adv1G,A(λ) := |Pr[A(D,T0) = 0] − Pr[A(D,T1) = 0]| is defined as the advantage of an
algorithm A in breaking Assumption 1.
Definition 3. For any polynomial time algorithm A, if Adv1G,A(λ) is a negligible func-
tion of 1λ, we say that G satisfies Assumption 1.
Assumption 2: The following distribution is defined by given a group generator G:
G = (N = p1p2p3, G,GT , e)
g, h,X1 ←R Gp1 , X2, Y2 ←R Gp2 , X3, Y3 ←R Gp3 ,
D = (G, g, h,X3, X1X2, Y2Y3)
T0 ←R Gp1p3 , T1 ←R G
The advantage of an algorithmA in breaking Assumption 2 can be defined as: Adv2G,A(λ) =
|Pr[A(D,T0) = 0]− Pr[A(D,T1) = 0]|.
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Definition 4. If for any polynomial time algorithm A, Adv2G,A(λ) is a negligible function
of 1λ, then we say that G satisfies Assumption 2
Assumption 3: The following distribution is defined by given a group generator G:
G = (N = p1p2p3, G,GT , e), r ∈ ZN
g, h← Gp1 , X2, Y2, Z2 ← Gp2 , X3 ← Gp3 ,
D = (G, g,X3, Z2, g
rX2, hY2)
T0 = e(g, h)
r, T1 ← GT
Adv3G,A(λ) = |Pr[A(D,T0) = 0] − Pr[A(D,T1) = 0]| is defined as the advantage of an
algorithm A in breaking Assumption 3.
Definition 5. If for any polynomial time algorithm A, Adv3G,A(λ) is a negligible function
of 1λ, then we say that G satisfies Assumption 3.
3. Efficient Predicate Encryption
We construct an IND-AH-CPA secure inner-product predicate encryption scheme
F = {fv¯|v¯ ∈ Znp \{0¯}}, with fv¯(x¯) = 1 if x¯v¯ = 0 mod p1 is this class of predicates.
In our construction, for encryption and decryption we use the subgroup Gp1 ; for key
randomization, we use Gp3 ; Gp2 will not be used in real encryption scheme, but only
for semi-functional keys and semi-functional cipher-text. The predicates of the user and
attributes of the cipher-text are all expressed as vectors. It should be noted here that we
require each element of the vector cannot be 0, and
∑
i=1,··· ,n xi 6= 0.
1. Setup(1λ). The KGC first runs G(1λ) to get output G = (N = p1p2p3, G,GT , e). It
then choose random generators g, h ∈ Gp1 , X3 ∈ Gp3 and random a ∈ ZN , ti ∈ ZN ,
i = 1, · · · , n, where a 6= ti. The output public parameters and master key are
PK = {g, h, g1 = ga, {Ti = gti}i=1,··· ,n},
MK = {a, {ti}i=1,··· ,n}
2. KeyGen(MK, v¯). For user with predicate vector v¯ = {v1, · · · , vn}, the KGC runs
this algorithm to output a user’s private key. First, random values s ∈ ZN , and
Wi ∈ Gp3 , i = 1, · · · , n are chosen, then it creates the private key as follows:
skv¯ = {{di = (hgsviWi)1/(a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n}
3. Encrypt(PK, x¯,m). For message m ∈ M with sum not equal to 0 and attribute
vector x¯, the sender chooses random r ∈ ZN and encrypts as follows:
c = {c0 = me(g, h)−r
∑
i=1,··· ,n xi , {ci = (g1T−1i )rxi}i=1,··· ,n}
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4. Decrypt(skv¯, c). The cipher-texts are decrypted as follows:
c0 ·
∏
i=1,··· ,n
e(ci, di)
Correctness. If the cipher-text is well-formed, then we can see that correctness holds:
c0 ·
∏
i=1,··· ,n
e(ci, di) = me(g, h)
−r∑i=1,·,n xi
·
∏
i=1,··· ,n
e((gr1T
−r
i )
xi , (hgsviWi)
1/(a−ti)) = me(g, h)−r
∑
i=1,·,n xie(g, h)r
∑
i=1,·,n xi
·e(g, h)sr
∑
i=1,·,n xivi = me(g, g)sr
∑
i=1,·,n xivi
If x¯v¯ 6= 0 mod p1, then the decryption result will be a random element in the group of
GT . If x¯v¯ = 0 mod p1, namely fv¯(x¯) = 1, the decryption result will be m.
3.1. Security
Like [25, 7], we use the dual system encryption methodology to prove the security. Two
additional structures: semi-functional cipher-texts and semi-functional keys are used in
our proof, but will not be used in the real system.
Semi-functional cipher-text. Let g2 denote a generator of Gp2 . c ∈ ZN , and {zi ∈
ZN}i=1,··· ,n are random selected. A semi-functional cipher-text consists of the following:
{ci = (gr1xigczi2 )a−ti}i=1,··· ,n
Semi-functional Key. Let g2 denote a generator of Gp2 . d ∈ ZN and {yi ∈ ZN}i=1,··· ,n
are random selected. A semi-functional key consists of the following:
{di = (hgsviWigdyi2 )1/(a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n
Both normal and semi-functional cipher-texts can be decrypted by a normal key, while
both normal and semi-functional keys can decrypt a normal cipher-text. When a semi-
functional cipher-text is decrypted by a semi-functional key, there exists an additional
term e(g2, g2)
cd
∑
i=1,··· ,n yizi . Notice that when decrypting a semi-functional cipher-text, a
semi-functional key, which satisfying
∑
i=1,··· ,n yizi = 0, can be used to decrypt success-
fully.
By using a sequence of games, we prove the security of our system based on the
above assumptions. Both cipher-texts and keys are normal in Gamereal, while in the
second game Game0, all keys are normal and the cipher-text is semi-functional. The first
k key queries are semi-functional and the remaining are normal during Game Gamek.
When reaching to the final game Gamefinal, the challenge cipher-text is a semi-functional
encryption of a random message, while all of the key queries are semi-functional. These
games are indistinguishable based on the following lemmas.
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Lemma 1. If for a polynomial time adversary A, there exists AdvGamerealA −AdvGame0A = ,
then with advantage , we can construct a polynomial time simulator B breaking Assump-
tion 1.
Proof. B is given a challenge sample of Assumption 1 as an input of the Setup algorithm,
(G, g, h,X3, T ). B chooses random value a ∈ ZN , ti ∈ ZN , i = 1 · · · , n. The public
parameters are the same as Setup algorithm. B will simulate Gamereal and Game0 with
A.
For the key queries v¯, since the KeyGen algorithm B knows the MK, by using this
secret value, it can generate a normal key.
As for the challenge (m0,m1) and (x¯0, x¯1), B embed the Assumption 1 into the chal-
lenge cipher-text. A random coin b is first flipped and set as:
c∗ = {c0 = mbe(T, h)−
∑
i=1,··· ,n x
b
i , {ci = T xbi (a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n}
If T ∈ Gp1 , namely T = gr, then this is a correct normal cipher-text. If T ∈ Gp1p2 , namely
T = grgc2, we implicitly set zi = xi. However from conclusion of the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, the values of xi mod p1 are independent from zi mod p2. The cipher-text is
a semi-functional cipher-text with properly distribution. A can be used by B to gain
advantage  in breaking Assumption 1.
Lemma 2. If for a polynomial time adversary A, there exists AdvGamek−1A −AdvGamekA = ,
then with advantage , we can construct a polynomial time simulator B breaking Assump-
tion 2.
Proof. (Gg, h,X3, X1X2, Y2Y3, T ) as a challenge sample of Assumption 2 is given to B.
Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 1, the public parameters are generated in the same
way. B simulates Gamek−1 and Gamek with A.
Upon receiving key queries v¯, for queries larger than k B forms normal keys, for
queries less than k B forms semi-functional keys, for the kth query B forms either normal
or semi-functional.
By using MK, B can generate normal keys by running the KeyGen algorithm, for
queries larger than k. For the queries less than k, B chooses random values s, d ∈ ZN ,
then the following is defined as the semi-functional key:
{di = (hgsviWi(Y2Y3)dyi)1/(a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n
B uses the value of T in the challenge for the kth key query. The key is set as:
{di = (hT viWi)1/(a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n
If T ∈ Gp1Gp3 , then this is a properly distributed normal key. If T ∈ Gp1p2p3 , namely
T = gsgd2g
f
3 , we implicitly set yi = vi. This is a semi-functional key due to the Chinese
Remainder Theorem.
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Now, we discuss whether B can distinguish the simulated kth query, which is semi-
functional in Gamek and normal in Gamek−1 by itself. If B itself has constructed a valid
semi-functional cipher-text with x¯v¯ = 0, since B doesn’t know the factor of N and X1X2
is the only one can be used for semi-functional cipher-text, the simulated cipher-text must
contain it. It implies that zi = xi. Then we have z¯y¯ = x¯v¯ = 0. Decryption still works fine.
Therefore, B, without ability to distinguish the simulated kth key from semi-functional
and functional, can only use the output of A to break the Assumption.
As for the challenge (m0,m1) and (x¯0, x¯1), B flips a random coin b, and sets: c∗ =
{c0 = mbe(X1X2, h)−
∑
i=1···n x
b
i , {ci = (X1X2)xbi (a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n}
If X1X2 = g
rgc2, we then set zi = xi. Following the rule of the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, these values are also actually uncorrelated in the subgroups p1, p2. This is a
properly distributed semi-functional cipher-text.
The output of A can be used by B to break Assumption 2 with advantage .
Lemma 3. A polynomial time simulator B with advantage  can be constructed to break
Assumption 3, if there is a polynomial time adversary A such that AdvGameqA −AdvGamefinalA =
.
Proof. (G, g,X3, Z2, grX2, hY2, T ) as a challenge sample of Assumption 3, is given to B.
B chooses random values a ∈ ZN , ti ∈ ZN , i = 1 · · · , n. The public parameters are set
as: PK = (g, hY2, g1 = g
a, {Ti = gti}i=1,··· ,n). For it is hard to find a factor of N , hY2 will
seem indistinguishable from h to A. B simulate Gameq and Gamefinal as follows.
As for the key queries v¯, B chooses random s, y′i ∈ ZN , and sets the semi-functional
key as:
{di = (hY2gsviZy
′
i
2 Wi)
1/(a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n
Let Y2 = g
f
2 , Z2 = g
d
2 , we implicitly set yi = y
′
i + f/d. This is a semi-functional
cipher-text.
As for the challenge (m0,m1) and (x¯0, x¯1), B will embed into the challenge cipher-text
the Assumption 3. It flips a random coin b, and sets: c∗ = {c0 = mbT−
∑
i=1···n x
b
i , {ci =
(grX2)
xbi (a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n}
If T = e(g, h)r, it is a valid semi-functional cipher-text. If T ∈ GT , this is a semi-
functional encryption for a random message, and this simulation of Gamefinal is perfect.
The output of A can be used by B to gain advantage  in breaking Assumption 3.
Theorem 1. Our PE system is IND-AH-CPA secure based on the Assumptions 1, 2,
and 3.
Proof. According to the previous lemmas, Gamereal is indistinguishable from Gamefinal
based Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. The challenge cipher-text is independent with b for
Gamefinal. Therefore, our predicate encryption scheme is IND-AH-CPA secure.
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Table 1: Comparisons of computational efficiency with other schemes
Schemes Key Size Cipher-text Size Encryption time Decryption time Security
Katz [2] 2(n + 1)g 2(n + 1)g + 1gT (4n + 2)p (2n + 1)e Selective
Lewko [11] Ng Ng + 1gT Np Ne adaptive
Ours ng ng + 1gT (1 + n)p ne adaptive
3.2. Efficiency
On cipher-text size, private key size, and computation time for decryption and en-
cryption, our scheme has better efficiency compared to [2, 11], we can see the results in
Table 1.
Let us note here N ≥ 2n + 3. g denotes one group element in G and gT denotes
one group element in GT . p and e represents the modular power operation and pairing
operation. The cost of our scheme is only a half of [2, 11] fromTable 1. Only approximately
one group element in G is contained in the cipher-text for each attribute, while two in [2].
Only one group elements in G for each attribute for the user’s private keys, while two in
[2]. e(g, h) and (giT
−1
i ) can be pre-computed for the encryption, so there do not exist any
pairing operation. For each attribute, it only requires one power operation, while more
than two in [11] and four in [2]. For the decryption, one pairing needs to be implemented
for every each attribute, while two in [2] and more than two in [11] are needed. Therefore
our construction is more efficient.
4. PE-TO-PEFKS Transformation
In [8], Boneh et al. proved that an IND-ID-CCA secure IBE could be constructed
from a secure PEKS, they also derived that from a secure IBE it was difficult to construct
a PEKS, which was left as an open problem. Abdalla et al. [9] solved this open problem
in 2005, they found a general way to construct an IND-PEKS-CPA secure and compu-
tationally consistent PEKS from any IND-ANO-CPA secure IBE. But only whether the
keyword in the cipher-text being matched to the trapdoor with corresponding keyword
can be tested for this kind of PEKS. Aiming to generalize their work, we propose a general
way to transform an IND-AH-CPA secure PE into a secure PEFKS scheme.
The following steps define the PE-to-PEFKS transformation:
1. KG(1λ) use Setup(1λ) to generate (pk, sk);
2. Td(sk, w¯) use KeyGen algorithm to get tw¯, then it deliver tw¯ to the server;
3. First, choose a random element R, PEFKS(pk, x¯) use Encrypt(PK, x¯, R) → c to
encrypt keywords x¯, and set δ = (R, c);
4. If Decrypt(skv¯, c)→ R, then Test (tw¯, δ)→ 1. Otherwise Test (tw¯, δ)→ 0.
Our scheme’s consistency and security can be reduced to the security of predicate
encryption. We give the formal result and proof in Theorem 2.
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Theorem 2. The transformed PEFKS is IND-PEFKS-CPA secure and computational
consistency, if PE is IND-AH-CPA secure.
Proof. Assume adversary L1 can successfully attack the computational consistency of
PEFKS and let A be a polynomial time adversary of PE. In the key queries phase, A runs
L1(pk) to get predicate vector v¯′ and attribute vector x¯ such that x¯v¯′ 6= 0 but Test still
output 1. A also get (R0, R1), which can be used to break the computational consistency
for L1. A then issue query for the challenge phase, (R0, R1) and x¯, and the challenge
cipher-text c∗ encrypting Rb under x¯ is given out as the result. A makes key query for
v¯′, and runs Decrypt(skv¯′,c∗) to find b. The data privacy property of PE scheme can be
broken, namely
AdvPEFKS−CONSISTENCY∑
PEFKS ,L1 (λ) ≤ Adv
PE−IND−CPA∑
PE ,A (λ)
Assuming there is a polynomial time adversary L1 that can break the IND-PEFKS-
CPA security of PEFKS. Let A be a polynomial time adversary of PE. In the key queries
phase, A runs L2(pk) to get challenge attribute vectors x¯0, x¯1 with R. Given the challenge
cipher-text c∗ encrypting R under x¯b, A runs L2 to find b. During this phase, A answers
any trapdoor query of L2 via its key queries. The attribute hiding property of PE scheme
can be broken, namely
AdvPEFKS−IND−CPA∑
PEFKS ,L2 (λ) ≤ Adv
PE−IAH−CPA∑
PE ,A (λ)
4.1. Our PEFKS scheme
We construct an IND-PEFKS-CPA secure PEFKS based on one efficient PE. The
PEFKS runs as follows:
1. KG(1λ): KG(1λ) runs exactly the Setup(1λ) algorithm
pk = PK = {g, h, g1 = ga, {Ti = gti}i=1,··· ,n}, sk = MK = {a, {ti}i=1,··· ,n}
2. Td(sk, w¯): Td(sk, w¯) runs exactly the KeyGen(MK, w¯) algorithm
tw = {{di = (hgswiWi)1/(a−ti)}i=1,··· ,n}
3. PEFKS(p¯k, x¯): By first choosing a random elementR, the sender runs the Encrypt(PK, x¯, R)
to encrypt keyword vector x¯, and get c as
c = {c0 = Re(g, h)−r
∑
i=1,··· ,n xi , {ci = (g1T−1i )rxi}i=1,··· ,n}
The cipher-text consists of δ = (R, c);
4. Test(tw¯, δ): The server computes c0
∏
i=1,··· ,n e(ci, di). If it equals to R, namely
w¯x¯ = 0, the server sets Test(tw¯, δ)=1. Otherwise it sets Test(tw¯, δ)=0.
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4.2. Discussion on PEFKS
Only equal relation can be supported from previous PEKS schemes. The new notion
of PEFKS generalizes the concept of traditional searchable encryption. More sophisti-
cated and flexible relations between the encryption-keyword and trapdoor-keyword can
be provided.
In fact, PEFKS can include previous PEKS as subclasses, that means that PEFKS
supports equal relation. E.g. in previous PEKS, the encrypted keyword vector is set as
x¯ = (w′,−1) and the keyword vector is set as w¯ = (1, w). If w = w′, namely w¯x¯ = 0,
correctness and security follow.
PEFKS fully provides multiple keywords search that are expressed by conjunctive or
disjunctive logical connectives.
• For a disjunctive logical connective, “w1 and w2” which corresponds to the poly-
nomial evaluation p = r(w1 − x1) + (w2 − x2), the keyword vector is set as w¯ =
(rw1,−r, w2,−1). If x¯ = (1, x1, 1, x2) and p = 0, the Test will be evaluated to 1.
• For a conjunctive logical connective, “w1 or w2” which corresponds to the poly-
nomial evaluation p = r(w1 − x1)(w2 − x2), the keyword vector is set as w¯ =
(w2w1,−w1,−w2,−1). If x¯ = (1, x1, x2, x1x2) and p = 0, the Test will be evaluated
to 1.
More complex combinations for boolean formulas can be extended by conjunctive or
disjunctive logical connectives. More general polynomial evaluation p = w0 +w1x+ · · ·+
wdx
d can also be extended by the above polynomial evaluation.
Here we describe a simple application PEFKS’s. If the email is appended with key-
words “business and urgent”, the email server will deliver the email immediately to the
users. “urgent” and “business” can be defined as some values in the system. The user
sets the trapdoor tw¯ as w¯ = (w2w1,−w1,−w2,−1), where w1 denotes “urgent” and
w2 denotes “business”. If “urgent and business” are the associated keywords with the
email, a sender encrypts the email and appends with the cipher-text δ of keywords vec-
tor x¯ = (1, w1, w2, w1w2). The server then can test whether this email is “urgent and
business” by running Test(tw¯, δ).
4.3. Comparison of features from various schemes
In this subsection, we give the features comparison between our scheme and other
related schemes, the results are summarized in Table 2.
From Table 2 we can see that our scheme can simultaneously support privacy-preserving
encryption, fine-grained search capability and multi-keywords search, while other schemes
do not support these three properties simultaneously. It should be noted however that
our proposal cannot achieve verifiability of the search results, which is target our future
work.
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Table 2: Features Comparisons
Schemes Privacy-preserving Fine-grained Multi keywords Verifiable search
encryption search search results
Li et al. [19] No Yes Yes No
Cao et al. [20] Yes No Yes No
Zheng et al. [21] No Yes No Yes
Sun et al. [22] No Yes No No
Sun et al. [23] No Yes Yes Yes
Ours Yes Yes Yes No
5. A Framework for Privacy Preserving Predicate Encryption with Fine-grained
Searchable Capability for Cloud Storage
Our framework for privacy preserving predicate encryption with fine-grained search-
able capability for Cloud storage is described in Fig. 1:
1. Data owner Alice first encrypts her data sets as follows: she first uses our predicate
encryption to encrypt the encapsulated key K, then she uses the block cipher like
AES to encrypt the data sets by using the encapsulated key K.
2. She establishes the searching index for the encrypted files. She first chooses the
keyword vector w¯ corresponding to each data item and encodes its corresponding
encrypted keyword vector x¯ (these encodings can also follow a setup rule defined
for the whole system in the setup phase). Notice here that the keyword vector
is different from the encrypted keyword vector, they consist of an inner-product
relationship. Then she publishes the encrypted keyword vector and the keyword
vector. Finally she encrypts the corresponding encrypted keyword vector x¯ by using
the PEFKS mechanism and get the corresponding index header file for that data
item.
3. She outsources the corresponding index header, the encrypted encapsulated key and
the encrypted data item as a whole data packet to the Cloud. It should be noted
here that the encrypted data item can be larger than the first two parts, in this way
the system’s efficiency is significantly improved.
4. After outsourcing these encrypted data sets, in order to enable the Cloud can search
on these cipher-texts, Alice now sets up the search trapdoor for the Cloud. Here
we use a proxy at the Cloud to implement the search task, in practical applications
this proxy can be regarded as a very powerful server or information management
system. Alice outsources the search trapdoor corresponding to the keyword vector
w¯ to the Cloud. Note here that this search trapdoor can be first obtained by Alice
from querying the PKG.
5. All of the above steps can be seen as Phase 1. The next steps can be seen as Phase
2. In Phase 2, the data user Bob (also can include Alice herself) wants to search on
the cipher-texts. He first queries from the Cloud with the keyword vector w¯.
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6. Now the Cloud (the proxy) first finds the search trapdoor associated with the key-
word vector w¯. Then it uses this trapdoor to implement the Test algorithm of
PEFKS on the first header of each cipher-text data packet. If the cipher-texts
contains this keyword, the Test algorithm will return 1, otherwise it will return 0.
In this way, the Cloud can implement this searching and return the correct search
results to the users.
PE (K) EK(file)
Data Owner Data User
Search Trapdoor
Associated with 
Keyword Vector
Search Results
Outsourcing 
Ciphertexts
Proxy
PEFKS Mechanism
Predicate Encryption
PEFKS(    )
Keyword Vector 
Outsourcing Ciphertext for 
Encrypted Keyword Vector
Figure 1: The framework
Below we sketch the analysis of the security properties of this framework:
1. Confidential property. In our framework, all the data sets are encrypted by hybrid
encryption with keyword search. Concretely, the data sets are encrypted by the
block cipher, the encapsulated keys are encrypted by the predicate encryption, and
the keyword vector are encrypted by the public key encryption with fine grained
search mechanism. All the Cloud knows are the cipher-texts, it implements searching
on the cipher-texts, thus our framework can achieve the confidential property.
2. Privacy preserving property. In our framework, data sets are encrypted by the
block cipher and the encapsulated keys are encrypted by the predicate encryption.
As it is known, predicate encryption is a privacy preserving encryption mechanism.
Compared to attribute based encryption, the cipher-texts in predicate encryption
not only conceals the payload but also conceals the attributes. Furthermore, our
PEFKS mechanism also provides some extent privacy preserving property. Unlike
the traditional public key encryption with keyword search, the keyword vector for
the search trapdoor generation and the encrypted keyword vector are different. The
encoding for the keyword vector and its dual encrypted keyword vector provides
some extent of privacy preserving property for the inner-product relationship, for
example, there are many solutions of y¯ for a fixed x¯ if x¯ · y¯ = 0.
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3. Efficiency property. First, as shown above, our predicate encryption is more efficient
than some classic predicate encryption schemes. Secondly, the main computation
load is encrypting the data sets by using block cipher, which is very efficient. For
our framework uses the hybrid encryption with keyword search, thus our frame-
work is much more efficient in practical applications than directly using public key
encryption with keyword search.
4. Ffne-grained searchable property. As shown above, our system can support complex
searching patterns by adapting proper encoding techniques for the encrypted key-
word vector and the keyword vector for searching trapdoor, while the traditional
public key encryption with keyword search can only support equal searching rela-
tionship. Note that the relationship of inner-product zero can be used to construct
very expressive relationships.
6. Conclusion
Data security and privacy has become a major challenge for Cloud computing appli-
cations and Cloud Data Storage systems. Due to continuous data outsourcing to Cloud
platforms, there is an increasing need to efficiently implement encryption schemes for data
protection yet such schemes should allow flexible searching, processing, analysis and min-
ing of data sets at large scale. In this paper, we have presented an efficient inner-product
predicate encryption system. Our construction is IND-AH-CPA (indistinguishable under
chosen plain-text attack for attribute-hiding) secure by using the dual system encryption,
which is sufficient for the PEFKS scheme resulted from the PE-TO-PEFKS transforma-
tion. We showed how to design a framework for privacy preserving predicate encryption
with fine-grained searchable capability for Cloud storage. We also presented an analysis
for our framework’s properties.
There are some interesting open problems that deserve further investigation, such as
designing more sophisticated and flexible functionality F : Key × CT → {0, 1}∗ than
inner-product for PEFKS, exploiting the way of transformation of PEFKS to PE, etc.,
which we envisage for future work.
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